How do exporters react to the administrative burden of trading, i.e. documentation, customs clearance and technical control? Such administrative costs are variable costs that typically occur per shipment. Every shipment is to be accompanied by the necessary trade documents and must go through the inspection and customs clearance processes. Hence, exporters who can sell their products in fewer and larger shipments bear less of these costs. We use US shipment-level export data with more than 170 importers to identify the margins of adjustment at which trading rms respond to administrative costs. Data on administrative trade barriers are the number and list of trade documents and the time and nancial cost of administrative tasks from the World Bank's Doing Business database. We decompose total trade by country into ve margins: the number of shipments, the price and the physical size of a typical shipment, the transport mode, and the product composition. Preliminary results show that exporters respond mostly with the number and size of shipments and less by changing the transport mode or the product composition.
Introduction
With the diminishing use of tari-type trade restrictions, the focus of trade policy makers has been increasingly shifted towards less standard sorts of trade barriers, including administrative barriers to trade. As opposed to taris, which can be sources of government revenues, an important characteristic of administrative barriers is that they are a deadweight loss in a welfare sense.
We dene administrative barriers to trade in a restricted way. We do not mean the presence of administrative regulations as product standards, technical or health regulation per se. Rather, we dene administrative barriers as bureaucratic procedures/administrative tasks ("red-tape barriers") that a trading rm has to get through when shipping the product from one country to the other. This may involve, for example, the burden of preparing health certicates, but not that of making the product itself to comply with the health requirements.
We argue that administrative barriers to trade, as dened above, are typically trade costs of a 'per shipment' nature. They are not an iceberg type, for they are not proportional to the value of the product. Nor are they per unit costs. The tasks of trade documentation, cargo inspection, or customs clearance occur per shipment, and shipments may contain varying amounts of product units. Exporters who can sell their products in fewer and larger shipments bear less of these administrative costs.
While keeping total export sales unchanged administrative costs can be lowered by reducing the number of shipments, which in turn may require an increase in the size of a shipment, a change in the transport technology, or a move towards typically large-shipment (bulky) products in the product composition. At the extreme, the administrative burden may entirely prevent the sale of some goods to some destinations.
Bunching goods into fewer and larger shipments, involves tradeos, however. An exporter waiting to ll a container before sending it o sacrices timely delivery of goods and risks losing orders to other, more exible (e.g., local) suppliers. We believe the welfare costs of such inexibility may be large. In future work, we wish to calibrate a structural model that illustrates these costs.
Our emphasis on shipments as a fundamental unit of trade ows follows Armenter and Koren (2010) , who discuss the implications of the relatively low number of shipments on empirical models of the extensive margin of trade. They do not focus on the determinants of transport mode or shipment size.
The dominance of iceberg trade costs in trade theory was challenged by Hummels and Skiba (2004) , who argue that trade costs are at least partly per unit costs. This has important implications for trade theory: in contrast with ad valorem costs, per unit trade costs do not necessarily leave relative prices and relative demand unaltered. Demonstrating their hypothesis on a rich panel data set they get an interesting side result. The per (quantity) unit freight cost depends negatively on total traded quantity. Hence, the larger the size of a shipment in terms of product units, the less the freight cost per unit is, which in fact suggests the presence of per shipment trade costs.
Since bureaucratic trade barriers rather represent time barriers than nancial costs, our approach is strongly related to the literature on the cost of time in trade. An important message of this literature is that time in trade is far more valuable than what the rate of depreciation of products (either in a physical or a technical sense) or the interest cost of delay would suggest. Hummels (2001) demonstrates that rms are willing to pay a disproportionately large premium for air (instead of ocean) transportation to get fast delivery. The estimated premium (0.5% of the product value per day) far exceeds the daily interest rate.
A series of papers (Harrigan and Venables (2006) , Evans and Harrigan (2005) , Harrigan (2010)) look at the implications of the demand for timeliness on production location and transport mode choice. Harrigan and Venables (2006) point out that the high cost of time in trade is ultimately related to uncertainty. Uncertainty about the changes in consumer tastes forces producers to design, produce and deliver products to the nal market within the shortest possible time. The transit of product components between production stages, which are often geographically fragmented, should also be synchronized in a timely manner, since the delay of one single component can hold up the whole production process. As a result industries tend to agglomerate. In Evans and Harrigan (2005) the demand for timeliness inuences the decision on whether to import products from places close to the nal market at the expense of higher wages, or source from more distant importers with lower labor costs. Harrigan (2010) builds an Eaton-Kortum type model of comparative advantage with demand for timeliness, in which he also incorporates transport mode choice. Timely delivery can be assured either by sourcing from nearby producers, or by shipping the product via -the more expensive and faster -air transportation. The model predicts that faraway suppliers will have comparative advantage in small weight-to-value goods, which are more easily transported by air.
Beside the above two, location choice and transport mode choice, trade-os, our paper deals with a third trade-o. The choice is on the frequency/size of a shipment and the trade-o is timeliness versus smaller per shipment administrative costs. The demand for timeliness requires relatively small and frequent shipments, while the burden of per shipment administrative costs can be mitigated by reducing the frequency, and increasing the size, of shipments.
A paper closest in spirit to ours is Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan (2008), who also build on the timeliness literature and on the evidence of the lumpiness of shipments. They argue that lumpy trade is due to xed transaction costs, which force trading rms to ship products infrequently and maintain large inventory holdings. They dene "xed transaction costs" as the time lag between the order and the delivery of goods and other xed costs of transacting. When these costs are large, rms send shipments less frequently and hold larger inventories of imported goods. On rm level data they document that importers hold signicantly larger inventory holdings than non-importers and, hence, import shipments are larger and less frequent than domestic ones. Moreover, the same regularity holds within the rm for international versus domestic purchases.
Here we look at adjustments on the shipment size instead of inventory holdings. Our paper therefore provides complementary evidence to Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan (2008) .
More policy-oriented papers give estimates on the eects of time-related and administrative barriers on trading. Using the Doing Business database Djankov, Freund and Pham (2006) incorporate the number of days spent with documentation, customs, port handling and inland transit into an augmented gravity equation and nd that each additional day delay before the product is shipped reduces trade by more than 1%. Part of the policy literature is centered around the notion of 'trade facilitation', i.e. the simplication and harmonization of international trade procedures. 1 This line of literature provides ample evidence through country case studies, gravity estimations and CGE model simulations on the trade-creating eect of reduced administrative burden. An assessment of estimates shows that trade facilitation can decrease trade costs by at least 2% of the trade value, and this number may get as large as 5-10% for less developed countries.
The eects of administrative barriers
In order to test the hypothesis on the adjustment of shipment size and frequency to administrative barriers one needs data on international transactions at the shipment level. Standard trade data sets do not provide such information. We use data on US exports to 170 countries in year 2005 from the US Census Bureau. This data set tells the number of shipments 2 and the value (in US dollars) and quantity of trade within each 10-digit product category and partner country cell. Based on this information one can calculate the value (physical) shipment size for each product and importer by dividing trade value (quantity) with the number of shipments. Though the US Census trade database is not a shipment 1 For more see e.g. Engman (2005) or Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2005). 2 The US Census Bureau denes a shipment accordingly: "Unless as otherwise provided, all goods being sent from one USPPI to one consignee to a single country of destination on a single conveyance and on the same day and the value of the goods is over $2,500 per schedule B or when a license is required.", where USPPI is a U.S. Principal Party in Interest, i.e. "The person or legal entity in the United States that receives the primary benet, monetary or otherwise, from the export transaction." level database, the distribution of the calculated shipment sizes should be suciently close to the true distribution, since the number of shipments within each product-country cell is typically very small, and almost one-third of the cells contain only one shipment.
The database is also suitable for analysing the transport mode choice. It includes information on the share of trade value transported by air or vessel. If these two do not cover total trade, we assume ground transportation. We create a database with observations that are uniquely assigned to one of the three transport modes (air, vessel, ground) by dropping those observations, where more than one transport mode is used (16% of total trade value). This way the database becomes three-dimensional along the product code, importer and transport mode dimensions.
Regardless the rich nature of the trade database, the eect of administrative barriers on shipments can be measured only on an aggregate country level, since data on the administrative burden is only available for countries. We aggregate US export data to a cross section of importers in a way that retains most of the richness of shipment information from the original database, i.e. the information on the frequency versus the size of shipments, the value versus the physical shipment size, the transport mode choice, and the shipment size heterogeneity of products.
We decompose US exports to each of the 170 importers into ve margins. These are the shipment extensive margin, i.e. the number/freqency of shipments, and four margins of the shipment size: the within-product-transport price and physical shipment size margins, the transport mode margin, and the margin of product composition. The ve margins separate ve possible ways of shipment-level adjustment to trade barriers. In response to trade barriers rms may reduce the number of shipments, they may change the price, pack larger quantities of goods in one shipment, switch to a transport mode that allows larger shipments, or change the composition of exported products towards more bulky products.
Decomposing dierences in average shipment size
Let i index products (10-digit product codes), m modes of shipment (air, vessel, ground), and c partner countries. Let country 0 be the benchmark country (the average), for which the share of product-level zeros are the lowest. In fact, we want all products to have nonzero share, so that the share of dierent modes of transport are well dened for the benchmark country. (Note that the mode of transport will not be well dened for a product/country pair if there are no such shipments. This will not be a problem because this term will carry a zero weight in the index numbers below.)
Let n cim denote the number of shipments of good i through mode m going to country c. Similarly, q cim denotes the average shipment size for this trade ow in quantity units, p cim is the price per quantity unit (unit value). We introduce the notation
for the mode composition of good i in country c, and
for the product composition of country c. We dene s 0im and s 0i similarly for the benchmark (average) country. We decompose the ratio of total trade value (X) to country c and the benchmark country,
as follows,
Or let us express the same decomposition identity in short as
where, on the right-hand side, the rst, second, third, etc. terms correspond to the rst, second, third, etc. terms in the previous equation. The rst term is the extensive margin: how does the number of shipments dier in the two countries? The second term is a price eect: how much more expensive are goods shipped to country c, relative to the benchmark country? The third term we call the within eect: how do physical shipment sizes dier in the two countries for the same product and mode of shipment ? The fourth term is a mode of transportation eect: how does the mode of transportation dier for the same product? Some transport modes allow for larger sized shipments, as it is reected in Table 2 . Are those modes overrepresented? The last term is a product composition eect: how does the production composition dier? Are bulky items and/or items that typical travel by large shipment modes overrepresented?
If per shipment administrative trade barriers make trading rms send less frequent and larger shipments one should see the extensive margin to respond negatively and the within margin positively to larger per shipment costs. Firms may also choose to switch to a transport mode that allows for larger shipments, which should be seen from a positive response of the transport margin. Or they can alter the composition of the traded product mix, so that the share of products that are typically transported in larger shipments increases. In this case, larger per shipment costs are associated with a larger product composition eect.
Indicators of administrative barriers
We use the import side of the 'Trading across borders' section of the Doing Business (DB) database of the World Bank. The data is based on a survey among trade facilitators at freight-forwarding companies. It includes country-level data on the time and the nancial cost of importing a standardized cargo of goods. 3 We use data from 2009, because the procedural breakdown is available only for the most recent survey. Though other data is from year 2005, we do not see it problematic, given the very strong persistence of the DB indicators across years.
In the DB survey, the traded product is assumed to travel in a dry-cargo, 20-foot, full container load via ocean. It weighs 10 tons, is valued at USD 20,000, it cannot be hazardous and does not require special treatment or standards. 4 All trade procedures, except for the process of ocean transportation, are taken into account. In the case of importing, it means all procedures from the vessel's arrival at the port of entry to the cargo's delivery at the warehouse in the importer's city (the largest city by assumption).
The import transaction is broken down into four procedures:
• document preparation,
• customs clearance and inspection,
• port and terminal handling, and
• inland transportation and handling. 5 Both the time and the nancial cost are reported for each procedural stage separately. Time is expressed in calendar days, and it spans the period from the moment a procedure is initiated until it is completed. The nancial cost variables are in US dollars per container. They only include the cost of the procedure without taris, trade taxes or bribes.
In our view, bureaucratic barriers to trade are more closely captured by the rst two procedures, i.e. document preparation and customs clearance and inspection. The latter two, and especially inland transport, which is dominated by the freight cost of transit, are more closely related to moving and storing the goods. Hence, in the empirical analysis we are primarily interested in the eect of the rst two procedures, and leave the second two for controlling.
Summary statistics show large variations of indicators across the 170 importers (Table  3) . It seems that time and nancial costs to import tend to be larger for less developed countries; the median is 32 days and USD 1,813 for the African continent, in contrast with the 12 days and USD 1,160 for Europe. In terms of time, the best performing country is Singapore, where an import transaction is completed within 3 days, in sharp contrast with Chad or Uzbekistan, where the required time is 3 months. Document preparation is the most time-consuming out of the four procedures: it represents half of the total time for the average country (Table 4 ). In terms of nancial costs, however, inland transportation is the most burdensome, taking up almost half of the total cost for the average country. This suggests that the administrative burden of trading is better represented by the amount of time lost than by a nancial measure.
The relatively weak relationship between the time and nancial burden of administrative tasks is also evident from correlation coecients between the day and the cost measures of the same procedure (diagonal in the lower-left quadrat of Table 5 ). They are quite modest at 0.3-0.4, except for inland transit, where it is 0.8. Correlation coecients between procedures for either the day or the cost measure are not strong either, the highest being 0.66 for Document Day and Custom Day.
Empirical specication
We build on the gravity theory of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , who derive a gravity equation for bilateral trade between exporter r and importer c (in logs) as follows,
subject to the constraints on the relationship between Π r and P c , The need to account for the two MR terms has been recently the main challenge in the empirical applications of the gravity equation. The most commonly used solution, when country xed eects (or country-time xed eects in panel data sets) control for the MRs, is not applicable for two reasons: we have only one country dimension and we want to identify the eect of a country-specic (and not bilateral) trade cost.
We control for the MRs according to Baier and Bergstrand (2009) (henceforth, BB). They show that, under the assumption of bilaterally symmetric trade costs 6 (T rc = T cr ), the MR terms can be expressed by their Taylor series approximations (centered around a world with symmetric trade frictions, T rc = T ) as
Substituting these two MR terms into the gravity equation (2) we get
Note that the last (cross-product) term in the bracket is always constant across country pairs. Moreover, with only one exporter (US) all the r-specic terms are constants. Hence, on a cross-section of importers the gravity equation can be simplied as
where all the constants are now in α, T U S,c is bilateral trade cost between the US and importer c, and the last term M R c = N k=1 θ k ln T kc is the multilateral trade resistance of the importer, i.e. how restrictive the importer's market is towards all the exporter countries in the world.
The expression for the multilateral resistance can be simplied further in the case of importer-specic (i.e. not bilateral) trade costs, such as the Doing Business indicators. In the case of importer-specic trade costs, T kc = T c for all k = c and T kc = 0 for k = c, i.e. the trade cost aects all the exporters the same way, except for domestic trade. Regardless of the source country, the import customs procedure and documentation are equally burdensome 6 A similar, though less simple, solution can be derived for the case of asymmetric trade costs.
for all shipments, while domestic trade is not subject to such barriers. The expression 
(4)
Estimating this equation gives consistent estimates of the gravity parameters. We are however primarily interested in the comparative static eects and, as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) shows, the comparative static eects also depend on the country sizes. As it was rst pointed out in Behar (2009) , the dierence between the gravity parameter and the comparative static eect typically gets very large in the case of country-specic trade costs. Dierentiating equation (3) with respect to the country-specic trade cost, we get the expression for the comparative static eect,
i.e. the comparative static eect is the gravity parameter discounted by the country's income share. Since the importers' income shares in our sample are low (the average is 0.004 and the largest is Japan with 0.1), the above dierence is always large. 7 A further empirical problem in applying the Baier and Bergstrand method to countryspecic trade costs appears, when one wants to include more than one country-specic variables in the regression. In this case, the dierent θ c ln T c variables can become strongly correlated due to their common θ c element and create a multicollinearity problem in the estimation. A way to counteract the multicollinearity problem and to directly estimate the comparative static eect is the following. Note that θ c ln T c =θ ln T c + (θ c −θ) ln T c , whereθ is the average-sized importer's income share. If we estimate equation (4) by both including ln T c and (θ c −θ) ln T c in the regression equation, the coecient on the rst term gives consistent estimate of the comparative static eect for the average-sized importer ((1 − σ)θ), while the second term controls for the remaining part of the multilateral resistance.
Against this background, we estimate the following cross-section gravity equation, where we assume that the trade cost function is log-linear both in its bilateral and country-specic elements, 7 The dierence can also get non-negligible in the case of bilateral trade costs, if either of the countries is relatively large. Taking the US and the average importer's income shares in our sample (0.28 and 0.004, respectively), the comparative static eect of a bilateral trade cost is a factor of 0.7 smaller than the gravity parameter. Formally, the comparative static eect for the bilateral trade cost is
where z ∈ [total, extensive, price, within, transport, prodcomp ]. Hence, the estimation is done separately for each component of the decomposition identity (equation (1)) in logs on the left-hand side. We do not assume the gravity equation to provide a good description of the variation on the margins. We only want to know the contribution of each margin to the eect on total trade. By construction, the coecients on the ve margins should sum up to the coecients in the total trade regression.
On the RHS we include the importer-specic trade cost variables (ln T c ), keeping in mind that the estimated coecientβ 1,z gives the comparative static eect for the averagesized importer. In addition, we include the expression that controls for the rest of the multilateral resistance: (θ c −θ) ln T c . The set of importer-specic trade costs includes rst of all the variable(s) for per shipment administrative trade barriers to import from the Doing Business database. These may be the time in days and the log of the cost in US dollars of administrative procedures in the importer country. In addition, we include other nonbilateral trade costs, such as a landlocked dummy and the importers' average tari rate.
Additional controls are the log of the nominal GDP and GDP per capita of the importer. We include GDP per capita primarily as a proxy for the overall institutional quality of the importer. This way we can ensure that the administrative burden variable does not pick up eects from other elements of institutional quality, with which it may be highly correlated. Table 5 documents the signicant negative correlation between GDP per capita and the administrative barrier indicators.
ln T U S,c includes the bilateral trade cost variables: log distance from the US, dummies for common language, colonial ties, Preferential Trade Agreement and Free Trade Agreement with the US. The M R c = N k=1 θ k ln T kc term is the BB-type multilateral resistance counterparts of the bilateral trade cost variables. They are calculated by taking the sample countries (170 importers + USA) as the world total.
We estimate equation (5) with simple OLS and robust standard errors in the case of total trade. In the case of the ve margins, however, we exploit the correlatedness of the errors across the ve equations and apply Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) estimation.
Results
We investigate the eect of the time (in days) and the nancial cost of the trade procedures separately. Table 6 shows the estimated eects of the total days indicator, Tables 7 presents the total cost indicator (in log), where total means the sum of the four procedures.
The main message is that rms send larger-sized and less frequent shipments to countries, where the administrative burden of trading is larger. This is evident from the signicantly negative (positive) coecient on the total days or total cost indicators in the extensive (within) margin regressions. In contrast, the eect on total trade, which equals the sum of the eects on the ve margins, is more muted. For total days the coecient is -0.01, i.e. total trade decreases by 1%, if bureaucratic tasks take 1 day longer. Notice that this result is at the lower end of the result of Djankov, Freund and Pham (2006).
Our numerical results for total days can be read as follows. One day increase in the time to import causes an approximately 1.6% decline in trade due to the fact that rms send less shipments (extensive margin). This eect is however partly compensated on the within margin: rms pack more products in one shipment, which is equivalent to a 0.5% increase in trade. In the case of the nancial cost of trading (Table 6 ) the results read as follows. If the total cost to import is twice as large for an importer than for the average importer, exports to that country are around 35% smaller (100·ln 2·coecient), which is the result of a more than 50% decline due to fewer shipments (extensive margin) and 9%-9% increases due to larger shipment size (within margin) and the change in the product composition towards larger-shipment goods (product composition margin).
We run regressions also for the day and cost indicators of the four procedures separately. Results for the day indicators are in Tables 8 and 9 , results for the cost indicators are in Tables 10 and 11 , where we only report the coecient estimates on indicators in question. The rst tables shows the results from gravity equations, where the indicator of only one procedure is included. The second tables report results from a gravity equation with all the four indicators.
The signicant eect on the within margin that we observe for total days and total cost is mainly coming from the two procedures that are more strongly associated with administrative tasks (documentation and customs). When the other two procedures (port handling and inland transit) are considered, rms seem to decrease trade by reducing the number of shipments without signicant adjustment on the shipment size. These latter two procedures may not constitute pure per shipment barriers, so that increasing the shipment size is not necessarily the optimal response of rms. 8 If procedures are considered separately we also nd evidence for adjustment on the transport margin. Facing longer customs time (Customs Day variable), exporting rms tend to choose larger-shipment transport modes such as ocean or ground. In contrast, if the time to reach the nearest port (Transit Day) is large, rms switch to lower-shipment transport modes. An explanation for this reverse eect is that port in the Doing Business survey means ocean port, so in this case switching from the large-shipment ocean transport mode is rational. The same eect is present for the nancial cost of transit indicator. Finally, we nd no convincing evidence that administrative burden would signicantly alter prices.
Conclusion
The paper estimates the eect of administrative trade barriers on various margins of trade ows. We nd that exporters respond mostly with the number and size of shipments and only less by changing the transport mode or their product composition. In markets with larger administrative burden imports come in fewer and larger shipments, and larger-shipment transport modes are more often used.
in that cell. The former is referred to as the value shipment size, the latter as the physical shipment size.
We drop product lines, which correspond to low value shipments (2% of the total trade value). In the Census database trade transactions are reported only above a trade value threshold. Low value shipment lines are estimates based on historical ratios of low value trade, except for Canada, where true data is available. They are classied under three product codes as aggregates. Hence, they appear erroneously as three large shipments and distort the shipment size distribution. 9 Price is calculated as a unit value, i.e. value over quantity. It is an f.o.b. price, since exports are valued at the port of export in the US and include only inland freight charges. In the database there is no single quantity measure, which would apply to all product categories: product quantities are measured either in kilograms, numbers, square meters, liters, dozens, barrels, etc. It is therefore important to calculate the price at the 10-digit product level, where the quantity measure per product is unique. For some products the quantity measure is not dened; here we assume that quantity equals value, i.e. the quantity measure is a unit of US dollar.
Other regressors GDP and GDP per capita of the importer countries in current USD for year 2005 is from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database.
Gravity variables (bilateral distance, landlocked, common language, colonial ties) are from CEPII. Distance is the population-weighted average of bilateral distances between the largest cities in the two countries, common language dummy refers to ocial language, colonial ties dummy refers to colonial relationship after 1945. 10 Tari rate in the importing country is the un-weighted average of ad valorem tari rates for all goods in 2005 from the World Bank's "Trends in average MFN applied tari rates in developing and industrialized countries" database. 11 When data for 2005 is missing, either simple linear intrapolation between the two nearest data points is used or the closest year's value (usually 2003 or 2007) is taken.
PTA and FTA dummies indicate preferential or free trade agreements, respectively, effective in year 2005. They are based on the Database on Economic Integration Agreements provided by Jerey Bergstrand on his home page. 12 We dene PTA as categories 1 and 2 9 Low value shipment lines are 9809005000: "Shipments valued USD 20,000 and under, not identied by kind", 9880002000: "Canadian low value shipments and shipments not identied by kind", 9880004000: "Low value estimate, excluding Canada". 10 14 Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Gravity on total trade is estimated with OLS and robust standard errors. Gravity on the margins is estimated with Seemingly Unrelated Regressions estimation. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. 
